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Abstract Recently, Jeremy Tanner has published a highly informative review article in
the Journal of Hellenic Studies, in which he introduces and advertises “Sino-Hellenic
Studies” as a new and upcoming subfield in academic inquiry. Tanner particularly
focuses on what he terms “Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy,” while developing
his perspective clearly from within contemporary Classicists’ academic parameters. In
this paper, I approach the matter precisely from the other end, i.e. from within contem-
porary comparative philosophy, distinguishing four different approaches in comparative
philosophy, pointing out some pitfalls in comparison and offering a perhaps provocative
conclusion by provincializing and politicizing “Sino-Hellenic Studies”. The paper not
only seeks to supplement Tanner’s review, but also and more importantly to introduce
some fundamental methodological problems to be dealt with in any comparative inquiry.
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Die römische Geschichte ist oft […] mit anderen weltgeschichtlichen
Auseinandersetzungen und Situationen verglichen worden. Solche Vergleiche und
Parallelen können sehr lehrreich sein, aber sie führen auch oft zu merkwürdigen
Widersprüchen. Das englischeWeltreich z.B. wird bald mit Karthago, bald aber mit
Rom in eine Parallele gesetzt. Derartige Vergleiche sind meistens ein Stock mit zwei
Enden, den man an jeder Seite anfassen und umkehren kann.1
– Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer (1942), p. 18
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DOI 10.1007/s12138-013-0318-7
1“[…], Roman history has often been used as term of comparison with other conflicts and events in world
history. Although quite interesting at times, such comparisons may leave room for strange inconsistencies
as well. In this way, the British Empire is at times compared to Rome and at other times, with Carthage.
Generally speaking, such comparisons are like a stick which may be grabbed by either end.” (trans. Simona
Draghici)
R. Weber (*)
University Research Priority Program “Asia and Europe”, University of Zurich, Wiesenstrasse 7/9,
8008 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: ralph.weber@uzh.ch
Comparer, c’est d’abord mettre en perspective, et il faut y insister, qu’on me le
pardonne, en se mettant soi-même en perspective.2
–Marcel Detienne, Comparer l’incomparable (2000), p. 111
In a highly instructive review article published in the Journal of Hellenic Studies in
2009, Jeremy Tanner introduces “Sino-Hellenic Studies” as a new and upcoming sub-
field in academic inquiry. He ends his review by expressing the possibility that this
“will become one of the most stimulating disciplinary sub-fields within both Classics
and Sinology.”3 In a more recent review on an edited volume discussing comparisons
of Rome and China, Tanner reaffirms his confidence in the matter, asserting that
“comparative studies of Greece and China have, over the last decade or so, acquired
sufficient weight and momentum to constitute a specific interdisciplinary sub-field
(Sino-Hellenic Studies).”4 Still more recently, these assertions have met support by
Alexander Beecroft, who finds Tanner’s review article “already in need of
updating.”5
Whatever it might take for an academic sub-field rightfully to be considered as
constituted, it seems fair to suggest that there is something going on in Classics
departments (or with Classicists working in other departments) of interest to those in
the field of Chinese and comparative philosophy. In that field, explicit and implicit
comparisons with Greece have been customary for long, while many today have
come to consider them as part of the problem rather than of the way forward. David
Hall and Roger Ames, for instance, have argued repeatedly that, when investigating
“Chinese culture,” Greek philosophical vocabulary is part of the “useless lumber”
that Dewey saw blocking “our highways of thought” and that Hall and Ames see as
impeding “the development of comparative philosophy.”6 Sino-Hellenic Studies
evidently comprises comparative work in many different areas, for example, medi-
cine, science or poetry; philosophy hence being merely one area among many. Some
comparative issues arise across these areas; others are more particularly confined to
philosophy. Tanner, in his earlier review uses the notion “Sino-Hellenic philosophy”
2 “Comparing, that means first of all putting into perspective, and it must be insisted upon, that I be
forgiven, by putting into perspective oneself.” (my translation)
3 Jeremy Tanner, “Ancient Greece, Early China: Sino-Hellenic Studies and Comparative Approaches to the
Classical World: A Review Article” in Journal of Hellenic Studies 129 (2009): 105.
4 Jeremy Tanner, “Review of Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag (eds.), Conceiving the Empire:
China and Rome Compared, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, XX + 481 pp.” in International
Journal of the Classical Tradition 18, no. 2 (2011): 303.
5 Alexander Jamieson Beecroft, “Review of Hyun Jin Kim, Ethnicity and Foreigners in Ancient Greece
and China, London: Gerald Duckworth, 2009, VI + 217 pp.” in International Journal of the Classical
Tradition 18, no. 4 (2011): 606.
6 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and
Western Culture, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998, xvii. The quote by Dewey is
connected to the current subject and worthwhile to be given here at some length: “In any case, I think it
shows a deplorable deadness of imagination to suppose that philosophy will indefinitely revolve within the
scope of the problems and systems that two thousand years of European history have bequeathed to us.
Seen in the long perspective of the future, the whole of western European history is a provincial episode. I
do not expect to see in my day a genuine, as distinct from a forced and artificial, integration of thought. But
a mind that is not too egotistically impatient can have faith that this unification will issue in its season.
Meanwhile a chief task of those who call themselves philosophers is to help get rid of the useless lumber
that blocks our highways of thought, and strive to make straight and open the paths that lead to the future.”
(“From Absolutism to Experimentalism” [1930])
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and focuses besides science, medicine and comparative literature on philosophy, and
this is also the focus I shall adopt presently. In this paper, I set out to examine some
possibilities and limitations of Sino-Hellenic philosophy if viewed from the perspec-
tive of comparative philosophy. I shall proceed in three steps: distinguishing four
different approaches in comparative philosophy, pointing out some (potential) pitfalls
in comparison and offering a (hopefully) provocative conclusion by provincializing
Sino-Hellenic Studies.
Approaches in Comparative Philosophy
In his discussion of the philosophical strands of Sino-Hellenic Studies, Jeremy Tanner
distinguishes several approaches, and mentions many of the leading voices in compar-
ative philosophy that are in one or another way relevant to what he terms “Sino-Hellenic
comparative philosophy”. Tanner’s own comparative approach to comparative ap-
proaches takes its starting-point from within contemporary Classicists’ academic param-
eters. In what follows, I would like to approach the matter precisely from the other end,
i.e. from within contemporary comparative philosophy.7 Although the two ends histor-
ically share some ground, today they operate largely independently in many regards –
which is why Tanner can interpret their coming together as something new. Sino-Hellenic
philosophy, from the point of view of comparative philosophy, is at most only a special
case, besides, say, Sino-Indian philosophy, or African-European, Buddhist-Nyaya,
German-French – or whatever is considered to be a suitable object for comparison.
Comparative philosophy, simply by virtue of being “comparative,” may be said
in one way or another to involve a series of variables that may offer a heuristics of
help for a discussion of different approaches in contemporary comparative philos-
ophy. At least four such variables are distinguished in standard conceptualizations
of comparisons: 1. A comparison is always done by someone; 2. At least two relata
(comparata) are compared; 3. The comparata are compared in some respect
(tertium comparationis); and 4. The result of a comparison is a relation between
the comparata on the basis of the chosen respect. In short, the variables involved
are the comparer, the comparata, the tertium comparationis, and the result of the
comparison. The four variables are not independent from each other, and the
comparer comes to occupy a central position, that is, unless the comparison is
looked at merely technically as if it were irrelevant who is doing the comparison
and for what purpose it is done. The paramount centrality of the comparer to the
comparison is readily illustrated by the differences of approaches in comparative
philosophy, differences at times so striking as to raise skepticism that the approaches in
fact do at all share something in common that justifies putting them one next to the
other – that is, of course, beyond a general claim of them being about comparison and
being about philosophy.8
7 For a discussion of recent literature on comparison in contemporary comparative philosophy, see: Ralph
Weber, “‘How to compare?’ – On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy’’ in Philosophy
Compass (2013), forthcoming.
8 For a more detailed discussion of comparison and particularly the role of the tertium comparationis, see:
Ralph Weber, “Comparative Philosophy and the tertium: Comparing what with what, and in what
Respect?” in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy (2014), forthcoming.
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As would be expected, different approaches in comparative philosophy emphasize
different variables, and these emphases usually reveal something about the purposes
that the comparer attaches to the comparison. Given the common practice of marking
out some approaches as either “contextualist” or “decontextualist”, it seems to me
utterly important to underline that each and every approach “contextualizes” or –
better, I think – emphasizes one or several variables and de-emphasizes other vari-
ables (to the point of treating those almost as mere formalities). Out of the complex
matrix that represents all possible constellations of emphasis and de-emphasis, I want
briefly and exemplarily to highlight only four such constellations that seem to me
mirrored in contemporary approaches in comparative philosophy:
I. A first approach does as much as possible to de-emphasize the role of the
comparer while emphasizing all comparata as emancipated objects to be studied
in their respective historical contexts. The work of Geoffrey Lloyd perhaps
exemplifies this approach best. Lloyd is methodologically most refined and of
course aware that the de-emphasis of the comparer functions as an ideal only. In
fact, as he writes, we are facing a dilemma, for “we cannot, on pain of distortion,
impose our own conceptual framework. Yet we have to.”9 What is more, Lloyd
also has a declared interest in showing what we, today, can learn from the study of
ancient civilizations, but his main interest – I would argue – remains first and
foremost “to try to grasp how the ancient investigators themselves understood
their work, their ideas, goals, and methods.”10 In this, Lloyd clearly shows his
affinities with Collingwood and Skinner, and stays true to his Classicist sociali-
zation (which Tanner shares with him). What distinguishes Lloyd from others is
his explicit keeping a distance over and against both of his comparata, ancient
China, but also ancient Greece, speaking in both cases of a “distance that
separates antiquity from ourselves.”11 As we shall see presently, the locus of
“ourselves” in the constellation of variables is indeed crucial.
II. Emphasizing the comparer as well as the one comparatum that is somehow
considered not to be “one’s own” is a second approach. The work of Roger Ames
and his different collaborators, in which the distinction between “our own
tradition” (“our culture”) and the “other tradition” (“an alternative culture”) is
programmatic, is a case in point.12 Through his comparative method, Ames
seeks to bring forth “alternative responses to problems that resist satisfactory
resolution within a single culture” and he self-consciously operates from within
“the perspective of the present.”13 Yet, concurring with that emphasis on the
comparer is the one on the “other”, as when it is declared the “ultimate aim” to
arrive “at a more accurate picture of Confucius’ thinking”, at a “truer account of
Confucius,” or, more broadly, to understand “Chinese philosophy”, the
9 Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections: Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and
Chinese Science and Culture, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, 2. See also pp. 8–9.
10 Lloyd 2004, p. x. See also p. 87.
11 Lloyd 2004, 188.
12 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1987, 5, 8, 14 and passim.
13 Hall and Ames, 1987, 5 and 7.
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“Confucian tradition” or, simply, to take “China on its own terms” or to help
“rebuild the Chinese vessel with its own planks”14
III. A third approach emphasizes again the comparer but this time together with the
one comparatum that is somehow considered to be “one’s own”. François Jullien
in my view exemplifies this approach. Of course Jullien also emphasises China, he
writes: Il y a à cette enquête un premier intérêt, qui la rend directement utile :
pouvoir « décoder » la Chine. [There is a primary interest in my study that makes it
directly useful: to be able to ‘decode’ China.]15 But I would be prepared to argue
that Jullien’s interest in decoding China is instrumental only, that China functions
as a heterotopic image in a (pseudo-)Foucauldian way and that the main emphasis
in the approach is put on that for which China is the other.16 As Jullien admits:
Mais c’est peut-être de la Grèce que je cherche le plus à m’approcher. [But it is
perhaps Greece that I seek to approach most].17 Yet it is not only Greece, but also
contemporary Europe or the West. Jullien often is explicit that he sees China as a
heterotopy as the only place from where to extract any really helpful and really
novel perspective; a perspective that so-called critical approaches from within
European philosophy could not possibly come up with.
IV. A fourth approach, finally, de-emphasizes all comparata, but emphasizes per-
haps more greatly than any of the other approaches the comparer, i.e. at least in a
specific sense. It is this approach that is often thought of as “decontextualizing”,
but I think that this is a very misguided view, for the approach emphasizes the
“context” of the comparer, more specifically, some debate or discourse in which
the comparer is involved and to which she or he seeks to contribute. In the field
of Chinese and comparative philosophy, Bo Mou and his method of a construc-
tive engagement may be taken as representative of this approach. Tanner lists
14 Hall and Ames, 1987, 7; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking Through the
Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, 155; Hall
and Ames 1998, xi; Roger T. Ames, “Indigenizing globalization and the hydraulics of culture: taking
Chinese philosophy on its own terms” in Globalizations 1, no. 2 (2004): 175.
15 François Jullien, Détour et l‘accès: Stratégies du sens en Chine, en Grèce, Paris: Grasset, 1995, 8.
16 My use of the notion of “pseudo-Foucauldian” requires justification. Although the term “heterotopy” is
mentioned in only two of Foucault’s texts (Preface of Les Mots et les Choses and “Des Espaces Autres”)
and notoriously ill-defined, Jullien’s reconfiguring of China as a heterotopy is departing from Foucault in
important regards. First, Foucault is very clear that heterotopias are located within a society (his examples
being rest homes, prisons, American motel rooms, fairgrounds, brothels, etc.), and not “elsewhere” in the
sense in which Jullien invokes the term as also geographically elsewhere – if this is what he does. For it
would still be possible that China in Jullien’s writings figures as a sort of discursive heterotopy in the
manner perhaps suggested by Foucault’s discussion of Borges’ Chinese encyclopedia. But that would
relegate China completely into the “imaginary realm” of a mirror image that has no connection to the China
as a “real place”. So, Jullien’s options come down to either invoking China as a heterotopy as a real place
that is not within the society to which it is the other or as a heterotopy that is a mirror (bordering on utopia)
for the society to which it is the other but that is no longer a real place. Besides, many interpreters of
Foucault understand the more extensive discussion of heterotopias in “Des Espaces Autres” as clarifying
the question whether there might be also discursive heterotopias besides material heterotopias. In that essay,
Foucault is explicit that heterotopias are “real places”. See: Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An
Archeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, xviii; Michel Foucault, “Of Other
Spaces” in diacritics: a review of contemporary criticism 16, no. 1 (1986): 22–27; Peter Johnson,
“Unravelling Foucault’s ‘different spaces’” in History of the Human Sciences 19, no. 4 (2006): 75–90;
Françoise Gaillard, “Du danger du penser” in Jean Allouch, Alain Badiou et al., Oser construire: Pour
François Jullien, Paris: Le Seuil, 2007, 14.
17 Jullien, 10.
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Lisa Raphals as pursuing a “systematically philosophical” approach, but this is
true I would hold only in a mild fashion.18 For in a more radically pursued
fashion, the comparata would be de-emphasized completely, meaning that their
identity would no longer play an argumentative role beyond the demarcation of
positions, which perhaps would render inappropriate any mention of this ap-
proach in terms of comparative philosophy.
These four approaches, I think, give a useful heuristics that is conceptually sound,
but that of course does not entirely capture the approaches pursued in the field, which
always manifest differences among each other that are differences in degree rather
than in kind. Also, I do not insist that the scholars that I have just mentioned as
exemplifying each of the approaches are the best possible choices. That would be
important, too, but is not my current concern. Still, if you agree that the presented
heuristics is conceptually sound and that there would be scholars coming close to
representing one or the other approach, then it seems to me that you would also agree
that the question whether these four approaches are to be understood as four ap-
proaches in a commonly shared task of comparative philosophy or four approaches
approaching each something different is not easy to answer. I think that both cases
could be argued successfully. What is important for the purposes of my argument, for
my comparison of comparative approaches, is that it is not an absurd position to
assume that very different purposes might be sustaining these different comparative
approaches, even if viewed in terms of philosophy only. This might easily come to be
forgotten when viewing the different approaches in comparative philosophy merely
as variants available for pursuing Sino-Hellenic philosophy understood as united by
some purpose in terms of inquiry.
Sino-Hellenic philosophy, as I have mentioned above, from the point of view of
comparative philosophy at most constitutes one special case of two comparata picked
from among innumerable other possible comparata, and, needless to say, they are a
special case that easily could and in much work is presented in still more special
terms. But the name Sino-Hellenic philosophy at the very least seems to demand that
any work done in its name focuses on two or more comparata that can be grouped as
either Sinic or Hellenic, with at least one comparatum being grouped under each.
Although the name Sino-Hellenic philosophy apparently does not include any re-
striction in terms of period, it seems to be at least implicitly understood that there is
such a restriction to the period of Greek and Chinese antiquity, and if Sino-Hellenic
Studies are presented as a sub-field of Classics, as they are presented in Tanner’s
review, then the restriction is verging on the explicit. Yet, on the other hand, Tanner
includes Robert Wardy’s Aristotle in China in his survey, notably as an “approach in
Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy”, which is a study about an early seventeenth
century translation into Chinese of a Latin translation of Aristotle’s Categories.19
I am not quite sure whether or not the name Sino-Hellenic philosophy and the way
the sub-field is presented by Tanner would not preclude the second and third
approaches – if carried to extremes – for lack of explicit interest in comparison of
ancient Greece and China, because the second approach simply could be called Sinic
18 Tanner, 2009, 95.
19 Tanner, 2009, 99. See: Robert Wardy, Aristotle in China: Language, Categories and Translation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
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philosophy (its aim being to get rid of Greek and other “Western” distorting
concepts), whereas the third approach would reduce the mention of Sino, and
its mention in the first position to a mockery (China merely being an instru-
ment to deconstruct Greek and “European” philosophy). As regards the fourth
approach, any exclusive restriction to a particular period and to two comparata
as exclusively meaningful comparata would seem rather peculiar. Nonetheless,
Tanner does include the fourth approach and also both Ames and Jullien in his
discussion, which implies that for him their approaches somehow squarely fall
within the scope of Sino-Hellenic philosophy. But perhaps, if anything, this is a
consequence from approaching a comparison of comparative approaches from
the viewpoint of Sino-Hellenic Studies as a sub-field of Classics. Ames admit-
tedly pursues a comparative interest (Jullien perhaps less so) and is certainly
working in comparative philosophy, yet it is in my view mistaken to think just
because a text contains philosophical discussion drawing on ancient Greek and
Chinese sources that it is therefore about Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy.
Let me give an example to show that I am not merely splitting hairs. Tanner
opens his discussion of Jullien writing that Jullien “uses the juxtaposition of
Chinese with Greek philosophy to ‘open up a perspective’ which allows us to
‘question ourselves from the outside.’ Self-criticism within Western philosophy,
Jullien argues, has taken place only within rather narrow parameters, largely set
by the Greeks.”20 And a bit later, he mentions that Jullien’s Détour et l’Accès is
his most sustained “Sino-Hellenic comparison” – which is, inasmuch as it is true,
surely true enough. But what thereby goes unnoticed is that Jullien’s work is not
primarily about the Greeks, but depending on the topic that he is addressing also
about, say, the Enlightenment.21 In fact, with the exception of Lloyd and some
few others who more consequently focus on Greek and Chinese antiquity only,
much comparative philosophy will variously and without much ado be ready to
exchange the ‘Hellenic’ for ‘Judeo-Christian’, ‘Enlightenment’, ‘European’, ‘An-
glo-American’ or simply ‘Western’ – which, in turn, often serves to locate the
source of a problem, of an essentialist Greek quest for certainty, of Judeo-
Christian transcendence, of imperialistic Enlightenment rationality or subject-
object dichotomy or of an unduly dissecting Anglo-American analytic style, or
as it were of all of these lumped together as part of the West.
This brings up another issue, which is the almost pervasive inattentiveness shown
towards a set of qualifications of the comparata smuggled into the comparison. Many
texts – and this is true for the majority of scholars working in the field of Chinese and
comparative philosophy – will employ several of the following terms in any combi-
nation to qualify what is meant by Chinese and Greek beyond the field-constitutive
qualification that they relate to philosophy. Here are the terms: culture, civilization,
society, tradition, worldview, mentality, way of thinking, way of life, nation, peoples,
etc. Unfortunately, it is hardly ever argued how these notions hang together, and what
benefit is expected from using them at all in a particularly chosen combination.
20 Tanner, 2009, 97.
21 Cf. François Jullien, Fonder la morale: Dialogue de Mencius avec un philosophe des Lumières, Paris:
Grasset, 1995.
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Some Potential Pitfalls of Comparison
The first pitfall is one that may but need not be involved whenever there is talk of
“culture”. It is the pitfall of undue generalization, often, but again not necessarily, by
way of cultural essentialism. One of Lloyd’s methodological principles is the anti-
generalization principle, which is precisely there to warn against this pitfall. Lloyd
has also been working against undue generalization by repeating that “we have to
raise similar questions concerning the differences between Greeks and Chinese, but
also between different Greeks, and again among different Chinese thinkers.”22 Ames
has tried to get around essentialism by introducing a distinction between “cultural
dominants” and recessive elements, although he has most recently spoken out as
regards cultural generalization as being both necessary and desirable (against argu-
ments to the contrary by Paul Goldin and Michael Puett).23 With regard to Sino-
Hellenic philosophy, by virtue of its name only, there seems to be a tension between
the generalization that comes with the terms “Chinese” and “Greek” and the work that
is done in its name, which in one way or another is always covering ground that does
not allow for claims at the level of generality associated with these terms. An obvious
way out would be simply to be more specific in framing one’s comparative study by
acknowledging the institutional sub-field “Sino-Hellenic philosophy” as a marker,
but raising one’s claims only with regards to the ground covered, speaking for
example of Mencian-Aristotelian philosophy. This would bring about, I think, a more
productive way of dealing with generalization, in which a comparative study of
Mencius and Aristotle would always be an example of Sino-Hellenic philosophy as
well as a subverting exception to it, destabilizing that which is sustaining the identity
marker in terms of the content that has hitherto been ascertained in the identification.
Needless to say that the notion of “Mencian-Aristotelian philosophy” faces the same
tension again, although perhaps at another level, and one could always be more
specific, moving down the levels of generality and ending at that kind of particularity
which is then often called singularity – a concept that in my view either escapes
language and thus becomes meaningless or may function as a kind of limit-concept
(Grenzbegriff). So the problem is not that there is a tension; it could not be otherwise.
And that can simply be acknowledged and be dealt with in one or another way. The
problem is if it is dealt with by offering some sort of resolution of the tension, i.e. of
what cannot be resolved if one is committed to keep operating within the limits of
language. I would contest that the use of the term “culture” in much comparative
philosophy often and precisely works to obscure the tension between the institutional
marker, say, of “Sino-Hellenic philosophy” and the actually advanced comparative
study. And this then is a pitfall of comparative philosophy, both to be avoided in one’s
own work and to look out for in the work of others.
A second potential pitfall specifically concerns comparative frameworks such as
the one of Sino-Hellenic Studies, in which it seems that part of the reason for
comparison is a suggested contemporaneity of the involved comparata. It is thus
that Lloyd can keep a distance over against Chinese and Greek “antiquity”. Besides
22 Lloyd 2004, 79.
23 Hall and Ames 1998, xvii; Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, Hongkong: The
Chinese University Press and Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011, 20ff.
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more recent debates on multiple antiquities, which might help understand better the
epistemic consequences of what we do when we refer to “Chinese and Greek
antiquity”, the suggested contemporaneity often surreptitiously risks implying the
application of a measuring rod in developmental and other terms. Strictly speaking, a
comparison thus turns out not to be a comparison between two comparata, but a
comparison between two comparata in a particular period. From there, it is a short
way to ascertaining as the result of the comparison a relation in which one
comparatum is yet lacking what the other boasts – for instance, showing, “to the
less developed, the image of its own future” (Marx, Capital) – and where that is
interpreted as a difference conclusively explained by a hegemonic model of devel-
opment. The title of a review by Reg Little (about the same volume as Tanner’s
review) puts it succinctly: “When Civilizations Compete” – although Little shows not
much awareness at all for the political and philosophical question marks that such a
framing of comparative philosophy immediately provokes.24
This is not to say that comparisons that abstain from suggesting contemporaneity
are in any way safe from the pitfall; far from it, there is an entire body of scholarship
that explicitly relies on non-contemporaneity and advances arguments that entirely
rely on a developmental model. Think, for instance, of arguments about an ancient
Chinese thinker in fact having been the first to advocate democracy or about that we
can find a problem conventionally attributed to, say, Kant already in this or that
Indian text. Of course, these might be arguments that are justified on some ground,
for instance, as reactions against a continuing philosophical imperialism that fashions
an exclusive and politically effective history of ideas in a self-mirroring image. But
this does not do away with the fact that these arguments also rely on a common
timeline and perhaps on a measuring rod in developmental and other terms.
A third potential pitfall that I want to mention has to do with what I call “the politics
of comparative philosophy.” By this I mean the inevitable problematic that comparative
philosophy, and this applies also to Sino-Hellenic philosophy, mutatis mutandis, is not
operating in a political vacuum, but that there often is a political as well as other
subtext.25 Such a political approach to comparative philosophy has to be distinguished
from that comparative philosophy that is about political questions. What I have in mind
are the political agendas that motivate the comparisons, the reasons underlying the
choice of some comparata and tertia comparationis and not others, and so on; and it
matters little whether these agendas are pursued knowingly or unknowingly. Inmy view,
what matters is that they be made explicit and subjected to a self-critical reflection. Why
is it the case that today Sino-Hellenic Studies are upcoming and thriving? True, it might
simply be a consequence of a more globally inclusive awareness that has eventually
reached the Philosophy and Classics departments; and to that extent may indeed be
desirable. But there is certainly more to it.
A close look at the above-mentioned authors once again proves instructive. Ames,
in an earlier study with David Hall, registers that “comparative philosophy … within
the Western philosophical community has gained momentum.” But why is that so?
24 Reg Little, “When Civilizations Compete: A Review of Steven Shankman & Stephen W. Durrant (eds),
Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking Through Comparisons (N.Y., State University of New York Press,
2002)”, in The Culture Mandala 6, no. 1 (2003), online.
25 An insightful discussion of Classical Studies emphasizing political subtext is: Michael Lambert, The
Classics and South African Identities, London: Duckworth Publishers, 2011.
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Hall and Ames explain: “Partially, and this is true with respect to China in
particular, it is a consequence of pragmatic pressures to interact with those
cultures that have begun to emerge as economic and political powers.”26 In his
most recent monograph, Ames makes a similar point: “In this essay, I will
argue that the long-postponed impact of Confucian values on different aspects
of the world’s philosophical and cultural traditions is now on the horizon, and
that a creative fusion of Confucianism with other narratives will follow behind
the rise of China as a contemporary economic and political force.”27 Jullien, in
his most sustained “Sino-Hellenic comparison”, mentions that there are many
reasons to be interested in China, one of them being the growing importance
that China has in the world – although Jullien, to be fair, is clear that this is
not his major reason.28 Even Tanner, in his review, decides to end the piece
with the following observations: “The encounter of Western cultures and soci-
eties with a rising China will be one of the most pressing issues for the
humanities and social sciences in this new millennium. China, like the West,
has its own Classical tradition, and the comparative exploration of the roots and
character of these traditions ought to play an important role in this encounter.
The rise of China and Chinese studies and the opening up of Classical studies
offers a particularly favorable conjuncture for the development of comparisons
of ancient Greece and early China in which each culture carries equal weight.
There is every possibility that Sino-Hellenic studies will become one of the
most stimulating disciplinary sub-fields within both Classics and Sinology.”29
Note how Tanner in these four sentences not only uses the terms “traditions”
and “culture” in a not-further-commented-upon combination, but also how he
draws a line of continuity from Greece to the contemporary West. More
importantly, he affirms my point that the so-called ‘rise of China’ is a recurring
topos in discussions of Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy. But, we may ask,
does the acknowledgment of China’s rise explicate or support in any way the
philosophical arguments that Tanner, or, for that matter, also Ames or Jullien,
advance in terms of comparative philosophy? Of course it does not and, in my
view, it also should not. But why then mention it at all? It is obviously no less
important or less apposite to study African philosophy, notwithstanding that the
‘rise of Africa’ is not featuring in the headlines of the newspapers. But even if
you think that there is good reason why the ‘rise of China’ should call for
increased philosophical attention, it seems that you would then be hard pressed
why Greece should figure in the comparison – although, admittedly, Greece
these days sadly enough does abundantly feature in the headlines of newspapers
around the globe.
It might be objected that I have just mistaken the Greece of 2012, the Elliniki
Dimokratia, for the Greece of antiquity, the cradle of European civilization. And is
Europe not an economic and political power today, according to many indicators
much closer to China than to Africa? Is ‘Greece-meaning-Europe’ hence not
26 Hall and Ames 1998, xi.
27 Ames 2011, 4.
28 Jullien 1995, 8.
29 Tanner, 2009, 105.
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rightfully part of the comparison, particularly in view of disciplinary philosophy and
its continuing European hegemony? But, consider the basis of this line of argument.
Does the objection not rely itself on a pre-supposed continuity between the contem-
porary People’s Republic of China and the chaotic Warring States China of pre-
imperial times that is – precisely – as questionable as the one between contemporary
Greece and the Greece of antiquity? I believe that such continuity arguments in the
majority of cases, if anything, constitute another pitfall of comparative philosophy.
Needless to say, it is often ‘culture’ that is thought to sustain the continuity in
question.
Provincializing Sino-Hellenic Studies
To conclude, I would like to discuss further the possibilities and limitations of
Sino-Hellenic Studies by taking up yet a different point of view, i.e. by
provincializing “Sino-Hellenic Studies”, by dislocating its institutional center
to the People’s Republic of China. In recent years, there have been various
efforts to institutionalize something like “Sino-Hellenic Studies” in the PRC.
The label under which some of these efforts have been carried out is the ‘Study
of Chinese and Western Classics’ (zhongxi gudian xue 中西古典学), and Liu
Xiaofeng 刘小枫 (*1956) has been a driving force behind it. Repeatedly, Liu
has called out for the establishment of centers for the study of the ancient
Greek classics in the PRC and for building up Chinese Classical Studies in its
mirror image. Under his auspices, the Huaxia Publishing House has been
running two series called Classic & Interpretation, one devoted to ‘Western
tradition’ and one to ‘Chinese tradition’. They are also publishing a journal by
the same name devoted to both ‘traditions’. What is more, Liu has recently
proposed that Latin and Greek be promoted as electives in Chinese university
curricula. May Liu Xiaofeng hence be understood as pursuing and advocating
Sino-Hellenic Studies?
In a review of a volume by François Jullien together with a volume on
Jullien in Chinese entitled To Go Afar and to Return: Dialogue between Greece
and China, Thierry Meynard refers to Liu Xiaofeng as a kind of “Chinese
Jullien.” He writes: “As Jullien has learnt classical Chinese to read the ancient
texts of China in order to enquire about Western modern thinking, Liu has
learnt ancient Greek and Latin to read the ancient texts of the West in order to
enquire about modern Chinese thinking.”30 So Liu might just be fitting my
presented heuristics as pursuing the third approach in Sino-Hellenic Studies.
There is a problem, however. Liu is not only advocating the study of Greek
classics; he is also a fervent propagator of Sino-Christian theology and a self-
confessed ‘cultural Christian’ (wenhua Jidutu文化基督徒). This is to say that for
Liu, the classical question ‘Athens or Jerusalem?’ is easily and readily
30 Thierry Meynard, “Review of François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese
Thinking. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004, x + 202 pages and Du
Xiaozhen 杜小真, To Go Afar and Return: Dialogue between Greece and China遠去與歸來: 臘與中國的對話,
Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2004, 3 + 99 pages” in Dao: A Journal of Comparative
Philosophy 7, no. 2 (2008): 219.
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answered with an emphatic ‘Both, Athens and Jerusalem!’ Still, the question
poses a challenge – on the crudest of terms – to any facile continuity argument
from ancient Greece to today’s Europe – not because the continuity would be
with Jerusalem rather than with Athens (as, for example, Habermas in some
instances seems to suggest), but because focusing on one and ignoring the other
exposes the grotesque claim of an argument based on either Athens or Jerusa-
lem only.31
There is another problem with Liu’s approach to Sino-Hellenic Studies,
inasmuch as this is his topic. For Meynard adds an interesting epiphrasis to
the passage parallelizing Liu and Jullien, writing: “… of course, Liu’s approach
is more political, while Jullien stays at a more intellectual level.”32 These
qualifications, of Liu’s approach as “political” and of Jullien’s approach as
“intellectual”, will serve to sum up the main contentions of my paper. Meynard
is surely right to allude to the political purposes that Liu brings to the study of
Chinese and Western classics – although he could have been far more explicit.
Liu is also well-known in the PRC for his role in introducing the thought of
Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. Not only does he embrace the Schmittian friend-
foe understanding of politics and his critique of liberal democracy, but he also
follows Leo Strauss (along Heinrich Meier’s reading in terms of political
theology) as concerns the importance attributed to reading the Classics and
the method of reading them.33 Zhou Lian suggests that Chinese Straussians, by
which he understands “Liu Xiaofeng and his followers”, like their fellow
American Straussians “believe that, as members of a chosen few who know
the truth, they also will be entitled to rule the world someday.”34 The political
purposes of Liu’s Sino-Hellenic Studies are hence quite obvious and, although
Liu cannot be taken as somehow representing Chinese Sino-Hellenic Studies,
his voice is surely influential, given that the Straussians have been considered
“possibly the most popular, the most organized and the best-funded group of
the past 10 years in mainland China.”35 The contention that I am putting
forward is this: Does all of that leave the comparisons and their outcomes
untouched? Can we separate the subject-matter of the comparisons from the
31 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, “Israel or Athens: Where does Anamnestic Reason Belong?”, in Religion and
Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity, Boston: The MIT Press, 2002, 129–138; Jürgen
Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken: Philosophische Aufsätze, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988,
23: “So glaube ich nicht, dass wir als Europäer Begriffe wie Moralität und Sittlichkeit, Person und
Individualität, Freiheit und Emanzipation – die uns vielleicht noch näher am Herzen liegen als der um
die kathartische Anschauung von Ideen kreisende Begriffsschatz des platonischen Ordnungsdenkens –
ernstlich verstehen können, ohne uns die Substanz des heilsgeschichtlichen Denkens jüdisch-christlicher
Herkunft anzueignen.” [engl.: Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, Boston: The MIT Press,
1994, 15: “I do not believe that we, Europeans, can seriously understand concepts like morality and ethical
life, person individuality, or freedom and emancipation, without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-
Christian understanding of history in terms of salvation. And these concepts are, perhaps, nearer to our
hearts than the conceptual resources of Platonic thought, centring on order and revolving around the
cathartic intuition of ideas.”]
32 Meynard 2008, 219.
33 Zhou Lian, “The Most Fashionable and the Most Recent: A Review of Contemporary Chinese Political
Philosophy” in Diogenes 56, no. 221 (2009): 129–131.
34 Zhou 2009, 130.
35 Zhou 2009, 129.
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political purposes that motivate them? And, even if we can, are we well-
advised to do so?36
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